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This study uses strategic behaviour, leadership change, and feminist theories to examine 
patterns of judicial activity by the three post-Charter chief justices of the Supreme Court 
of Canada. Building on prior scholarship, we use various methods to examine patterns of 
majority voting, dissenting activity, opinion writing, ideological voting, and panel size across 
the 1973 to 2014 period. While Chief Justices Lamer and Dickson exhibited clear patterns 
of task leadership, we find strong evidence of strategic change by Chief Justice McLachlin 
following her elevation to chief. She moved from a prolific dissenter as a puisne justice to a 
chief who exhibited behaviour of both a task leader and a social leader, which scholars see 
as highly uncommon. Her efforts to solidify her central role as a collegial leader within her 
own court, which took place during a period of increasing panel sizes and a shrinking court 
docket, are remarkable.
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AS WE REFLECT ON THE LAST YEAR of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin’s tenure 
at the helm of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”), it makes intuitive sense 
to look back on her career as chief justice to examine her leadership and explore 
in greater depth how it compares to her two predecessors in the post-Charter era. 
We focus on the post-Charter era because it serves as a distinctive break point in 
the history of the Court’s rulings. Since all three of the post-Charter chiefs also 
served as puisne justices on the Court for almost ten years before ascending to the 
helm, we should also explore whether they dramatically changed their respective 
behaviours on the bench once they acquired their new mantles of responsibility. 
These inquiries become more salient given the decisive policy-making role the 
Court has come to play in Canada’s political arena over the past 30 years, a role 
that has drawn much attention and media scrutiny to the chief justice and the 
Court. We, like prior judicial scholars, rely on rational choice theory and the 
literature on judicial leadership to help guide the theoretical foundations of our 
inquiry. However, we add new insights derived from feminist theories of gender 
differences to guide our analysis. Ultimately, this study explores whether the 
three post-Charter chief justices became more strategic in their majority voting 
behaviours, opinion writing, choices of panel size, and ideological position taking 
once they assumed the helms of their courts. Building on prior research, this study 
explores in greater detail how leadership styles differed from chief to chief during 
critical post-Charter years, helping us tease out whether any of the modern chief 
justices have engaged in strong patterns of rational choice or strategic behaviour 
to shape the direction of their courts, and whether Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
behaviour might align with the literature on a distinctive feminine voice.
A study of this kind is important for numerous reasons. First, it provides a 
more robust understanding of an institution that has come to play a dominant 
role in Canadian politics in the post-Charter era. Second, an examination of 
the differences between the roles taken by the first three post-Charter chief 
justices may provide greater insight into leadership activity and possible gender 
differences of future judicial elites. Third, assessing the impact of how panels 
are struck has important theoretical implications for understanding strategic 
behaviour on the Court as well as practical implications for other democratic 
societies considering implementing similar institutional features. Fourth, 
examining possible behavioural differences that occur after the transition from 
puisne justice to chief justice enhances our theoretical understanding of strategic 
and leadership behaviour and its contribution to leading social science theories.
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I. REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
One of the salient social science paradigms used for studying political behaviour 
and group dynamics is rational choice theory. The gist of this theory is that political 
actors will pursue their policy preferences in most situations, but in small-group 
settings they will sometimes augment their behaviour in order to avoid an 
undesirable policy outcome.1 Since appellate courts are comprised of small groups 
of justices who must interact with each other on a daily basis to hand down 
rulings, judicial scholars use rational choice theory to help explain judicial voting 
behaviour. Strategic scholars of judicial behaviour agree with attitudinal theorists 
that a justice’s overarching goal is to seek his or her own policy preferences enacted 
into law, yet since high court justices are not unconstrained unilateral actors and 
cannot make binding law by themselves, they must take into consideration the 
preferences of other actors in the system in the course of pursuing their own 
policy goals.2 This research documents that justices in the United States engage 
in a myriad of strategic behaviours at all stages of the judicial process, from the 
selection of cases through opinion writing, in order to reach their most preferred 
positions. For example, since it takes five to forge a winning coalition on a court 
of nine justices, members often suppress their own preferred position when taking 
into consideration the expectations and preferences of others in order to avoid 
a worse case outcome. These scholars also document that strategic justices are 
forward-thinking actors who, when facing policy choices, take into consideration 
the expectations of outside governmental officials in a system of shared powers 
and dominant majoritarian beliefs. Scholarship on the post-Charter SCC 
highlights this type of inter-institutional strategic behaviour by documenting an 
ongoing strategic dialogue with Parliament and other institutional actors over 
1. Kenneth J Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 3rd ed (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2012); Peter C Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986).
2. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998) 
at 11-12; Forrest Maltzmann, James F Spriggs II & Paul J Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the 
Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 17-18.
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the machinations and meanings of key Charter principles.3 Other scholarship, 
in turn, has documented the strategic and political calculations that Canadian 
justices make when deciding which cases to take on appeal.4 Collectively, these 
scholars have shown that both US and Canadian justices act in a sophisticated 
strategic manner by continually negotiating the expectations and responses of 
other actors in the system when grappling with individual cases in an effort to 
negotiate their most preferred policy positions.
Research demonstrates that leadership roles have a profound impact on 
judicial behaviour on the Supreme Court of the United States.5 Pioneering 
3. For commentary on the Charter dialogue, see Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The 
Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights 
Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75; Peter W Hogg & 
Allison A Thornton, “Reply to ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 
529; Christopher P Manfredi & James B Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to 
Hogg & Bushell” (1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 513; Christopher P Manfredi & James B 
Kelly, “Dialogue, Deference, and Restraint: Judicial Independence and Trial Procedures” 
(2001) 64:2 Sask L Rev 323; Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism 
or Democratic Dialogue, revised ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016); Janet L Hiebert, Charter 
Conflicts: What Is Parliament’s Role? (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); 
Matthew A Hennigar, “Expanding the ‘Dialogue’ Debate: Canadian Federal Government 
Responses to Lower Court Charter Decisions” (2004) 37:1 Can J Pol Sci 3; Matthew A 
Hennigar, “The Canadian Government’s Litigation Strategy in Sexual Orientation Cases” 
(Paper delivered at the Canadian Political Science Association’s 76th Annual Meeting, 4 June 
2004), online: <www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Hennigar.pdf>; Peter W Hogg, Allison A 
Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright,  “Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or ‘Much Ado About 
Metaphors’” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 (published in a Special Issue of the Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal entitled “Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later”).
4. See e.g. Roy B Flemming, Tournament of Appeals: Granting Judicial Review in Canada 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Roy B Flemming & Glen S Krutz, “Selecting Appeals for 
Judicial Review in Canada: A Replication and Multivariate Test of American Hypotheses” 
(2004) 64:1 J Politics 232.
5. See David J Danelski, “An Exploratory Study of Opinion Assignment by the Chief Justice 
Revisited” in David J Danelski & Artemus Ward, eds, The Chief Justice: Appointment & 
Influence (Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press, 2016) 47 [Danelski, “Opinion 
Assignment”]; David J Danelski, “The Earliest Social Science Studies of the Chief Justice 
Revisited” in Danelski & Ward, ibid, 13 [Danelski, “Social Science”]; Charles M Cameron & 
Tom Clark, “The Chief Justice and Procedural Power” in Danelski & Ward, ibid, 202; David 
J Danelski, The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court (PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 
1961) [unpublished]; David J Danelski, “Conflict and Its Resolution in the Supreme 
Court” (1967) 11:1 J Confl Resolution 71 [Danelski, “Conflict and Resolution”]; David 
J Danelski & Jeanne C Danelski, “Leadership in the Warren Court” in Sheldon Goldman 
& Austin Sarat, eds, American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process and Behavior 
(New York: Longman, 1989) 500; David J Danelski, “The Influence of the Chief Justice 
in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court” in Goldman & Sarat, ibid, 19 [Danelski, 
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work by David Danelski relied on social psychological research of small-group 
behaviour to develop two theoretical archetypes for explaining leadership on the 
US Supreme Court.6 He argues that, for a court to work effectively in deciding 
cases and maintaining a congenial environment, a “task leader” and a “social 
leader” must emerge to guide the decision-making process, although both roles 
may be assumed by the same justice.7 According to Danelski, a task leader is 
the intellectual powerhouse of the court, whose technical competence, analytical 
ability, and intensity and force of argument allow him or her to sway other 
colleagues to his or her stance in a given case.8 In complex cases, colleagues often 
rely on the task leader for intellectual guidance. The task leader is a highly skilled 
legal orator and writer who often drives the resolution of cases without taking 
into consideration the feelings of others.9 As such, task leaders, in theory, write 
more majority opinions than their peers. Danelski argues the social leader, on the 
other hand, works to foster collegiality, smooth ruffled feathers, and bolster the 
esteem of others in an institutional environment that encourages conflict over 
core value positions in salient cases.10 The social leader’s aim is to ensure that 
everyone feels valued and to foster favourable social interactions so the court can 
work most effectively as a unit on a daily basis. The social leader is the best-liked 
member of a court because he or she empowers colleagues by telling jokes, 
encouraging others, avoiding conflict, restoring the peace through negotiation 
and bargaining, and providing passive acceptance of other colleagues’ views.11 
Implicitly, social leaders are harder to identify through case outcomes, but their 
supportive, collegial nature is theoretically found in joining majority coalitions 
more frequently than their peers, and in dissenting less often.
Subsequent scholars have built on Danelski’s groundbreaking work to 
explore in greater depth the interrelationship between leadership activity and 
“Influence”]; Walter F Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1964); Robert J Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986); Thomas G Walker, Lee Epstein & William 
J Dixon, “On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme 
Court” (1988) 50:2 J Politics 361; Stacia L Haynie, “Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. 
Supreme Court” (1992) 54:4 J Politics 1158; Saul Brenner & Timothy M Hagle, “Opinion 
Writing and Acclimation Effect” (1996) 18:3 Political Behav 235.
6. Danelski, “Conflict and Resolution,” supra note 5 at 79-82.
7. Ibid at 81.
8. Ibid at 79-81.
9. Ibid at 80.
10. Ibid at 81-82.
11. Ibid. See also Danelski, “Influence,” supra note 5 at 24-26.
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judicial behaviour within and across different US courts.12 We believe that social 
leaders have become equated with concerns about court solidarity and the overall 
satisfaction of justices in expressing their views and being heard, while task leaders 
have become associated with concerns about the overall intellectual prominence, 
stability, and direction of a court.
Danelski’s theoretical constructs for explaining leadership roles on the 
US Supreme Court dovetail nicely with certain feminist scholarship exploring 
distinctive gender differences in leadership styles between top-level policymakers. 
It makes sense to explore the impact of gender differences near the end of the first 
female chief justice’s career. Scholars in this field have often relied on two strands 
of feminist theory grounded in concepts from sociolinguistics and psychology to 
guide their analysis. Pioneering work by psychologist Carol Gilligan maintains 
that men view the world in a more linear, hierarchical, and individualistic manner, 
and thus are likely to resolve conflicts according to abstract rules incorporated in 
the language of absolute rights applied in a zero-sum, all-or-nothing fashion.13 
Women, on the other hand, tend to see the world as a web of relationships 
contained in a larger interdependent community and thus resolve conflict 
in a more conciliatory fashion utilizing the language of reconciliation and 
responsibility to society.14 Deborah Tannen’s work in the area of sociolinguistics 
reinforces Gilligan’s contention, suggesting that women’s communication styles in 
a wide variety of settings are aimed at solidifying relationships, providing support 
for others, and building consensus, while men often approach communication 
in an adversarial manner.15 Research in the field of small group dynamics in 
legislative settings arrives at similar conclusions about the more collegial and 
democratic nature of women leaders.16 The theoretical paradigm developed by 
these feminist scholars has become more prevalent as more women have been 
elected and appointed to powerful positions in government and courts. Having 
said this, the feminist arguments advanced above are by no means universally 
12. See e.g. Murphy, supra note 5; Steamer, supra note 5; Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 5, 
Haynie, supra note 5.
13. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). See also Barbara Palmer, “Women in 
the American Judiciary: Their Influence and Impact” (2001) 23:3 Women & Politics 91.
14. Gilligan, supra note 13.
15. See Deborah Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1990) at 24-25.
16. Lyn Kathlene, “Power and Influence in State Legislative Policymaking: The Interaction of 
Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates” (1994) 88:3 Am Pol Sci Rev 560 at 
561, 567-69, 573-74.
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accepted. A meta-analysis of more than 2000 psychological studies of the gender 
difference argument points out that in most circumstances, a gender similarities 
hypothesis has garnered more empirical justification.17 According to Janet Shibley 
Hyde, females and males are quite similar in their psychological patterns of 
behaviour across a large number of domains like cognitive performance, modes 
of communication, social and personality traits, and notions of psychological 
well-being.18 Even so, psychological studies show small to moderate gender 
differences in communication and leadership abilities, including a slightly greater 
tendency for men to interrupt in conversations, to engage in more frequent use 
of verbal aggression, to exhibit a slightly stronger leaning towards autocratic 
leadership, to be moderately more distrustful of others in groups, to be less 
oriented to an ethic of care for others, and to express significantly lower levels of 
agreeableness and tender mindedness.19 All of these domains have the potential 
to reflect gendered differences that might appear in the activities of justices, 
especially patterns of dissent and majority-joining behaviour. These conceptions 
of gender difference, when combined with Danelski’s constructs of leadership, 
provide a compelling line of inquiry especially at the end of the first female chief 
justice’s tenure on the SCC.
There has been a host of studies aimed as assessing gender difference in the 
legal realm in the United States and Canada, although most of the studies have 
17. Janet Shibley Hyde, “The Gender Similarities Hypothesis” (2005) 60:6 Am Psychol 
581 [Hyde, “Gender Hypothesis”]; Michael S Kimmel, Amy Aronson & Amy Kaler, 
The Gendered Society Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Janet Shibley 
Hyde, “Gender Similarities and Differences” (2014) 65 Ann Rev Psychol 373 [Hyde, 
“Gender Differences”].
18. Hyde, “Gender Hypothesis,” supra note 17 at 583-86; Hyde, “Gender Differences,” supra 
note 17 at 380-89.
19. Ibid. See also Kristen J Anderson & Campbell Leaper, “Meta-Analyses of Gender Effects 
on Conversational Interruption: Who, What, When, Where, and How” (1998) 39:3&4 
Sex Roles 225; Janet Shibley Hyde, “How Large Are Gender Differences in Aggression? 
A Developmental Meta-Analysis” (1984) 20:4 Developmental Psychol 722; Janet Shibley 
Hyde, “Gender Differences in Aggression” in Janet Shibley Hyde & Marcia C Linn, eds, The 
Psychology of Gender: Advances through Meta-analysis (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1986) 51; George P Knight et al, “Emotional Arousal and Gender Differences 
in Aggression: A Meta-Analysis” (2002) 28:5 Aggressive Behav 366; John Archer, “Sex 
Differences in Aggression in Real-World Settings: A Meta-Analytic Review” (2004) 8:4 
Rev Gen Psychol 291; Alice H Eagly & Blair T Johnson, “Gender and Leadership Style: 
A Meta-Analysis” (1990) 108:2 Psychol Bull 233; Alan Feingold, “Gender Differences 
in Personality: A Meta-Analysis” (1994) 116:3 Psychol Bull 429; Sara Jaffee & Janet 
Shibley Hyde, “Gender Differences in Moral Orientation: A Meta-Analysis” (2000) 126:5 
Psychol Bull 703.
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focused on lower appellate behaviour at the micro-level in specific areas of law. 
These studies have yielded mixed results. While some scholars suggest that no 
coherent generalizations can be made about the impact of women justices on 
lower appellate courts,20 others have demonstrated that gender differences do 
emerge in particular types of legal disputes, such as employment discrimination.21 
The few studies that have examined gender difference on the apex supreme 
courts in the two countries have also yielded mixed results.22 Comments by the 
20. See e.g. Herbert M Kritzer & Thomas M Uhlman, “Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of 
Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition” (1977) 14:2 Soc Sci J 77; John Gruhl, 
Cassia Spohn & Susan Welch, “Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges” (1981) 
25:2 Am J Pol Sci 308; Jon Gottschall, “Carter’s Judicial Appointments: The Influence of 
Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals” (1983) 
67:4 Judicature 165; Thomas G Walker & Deborah J Barrow, “The Diversification of 
the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications” (1985) 47:2 J Pol 596; Sue Davis, 
“President Carter’s Selection Reforms and Judicial Policymaking: A Voting Analysis of the 
United States Courts of Appeals” (1986) 14:4 Am Pol Q 328.
21. See e.g. Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R Songer, “Voting Behavior and Gender on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals” (1993) 77:3 Judicature 129; Donald R Songer, Sue Davis & Susan 
Haire, “A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts 
of Appeals” (1994) 56:2 J Politics 425. For evidence of other gender differences, see Gerard S 
Gryski, Eleanor C Main & William J Dixon, “Models of State High Court Decision Making 
in Sex Discrimination Cases” (1986) 48:1 J Politics 143; David W Allen & Diane E Wall, 
“The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices: Are They Tokens or Outsiders?” 
(1987) 12:2 Just Sys J 232; Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, “Gender, Race, and Partisanship 
on the Michigan Supreme Court” (2000) 63:4 Alb L Rev 1205; Donald R Songer & Kelly 
A Crews-Meyer, “Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts” 
(2000) 81:3 Soc Sci Q 750; Jennifer L Peresie, “Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial 
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts” (2005) 114:7 Yale LJ 1759.
22. For U.S. studies see Suzanna Sherry, “Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional 
Adjudication” (1986) 72:3 Va L Rev 543; Karen O’Connor & Jeffrey A Segal, “Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor and the Supreme Court’s Reaction to Its First Female Member” (1990) 10:2 
Women & Politics 95; Susan Behuniak-Long, “Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the Power 
of Maternal Legal Thinking” (1992) 54:3 Rev Politics 417; Sue Davis, “The Voice of Sandra 
Day O’Connor” (1993) 77:3 Judicature 134; Jilda M Aliotta, “Justice O’Connor and the 
Equal Protection Clause: a Feminine Voice?” (1995) 78:5 Judicature 232; Patricia A Sullivan 
& Steven R Goldzwig, “Abortion and Undue Burdens: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and 
Judicial Decision-Making” (1996) 16:3 Women & Politics 27; Nancy Maveety, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor: Strategist on the Supreme Court (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1996). For Canadian studies of gender difference in judicial behavior see Bertha Wilson, 
“Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 507; Peter 
McCormick & Twyla Job, “Do Women Judges Make a Difference? An Analysis by Appeal 
Court Data” (1993) 8:1 CJLS 135 [McCormick & Job, “Women Judges”]; Candace C 
White, “Gender Differences on the Supreme Court” in FL Morton, ed, Law, Politics, and the 
Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd ed (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002) 85; Donald 
R Songer & Ann Clark, “Judge Gender and Voting in Appellate Courts: A Cross National 
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justices themselves reveal different sentiments. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
claimed, “[t]here is simply no empirical evidence that gender differences lead to 
discernible differences in rendering judgments,”23 while Justice Bertha Wilson 
concluded that “[t]here is merit in Gilligan’s analysis.”24 Justice Louis LeBel, who 
recently served with four women on the Canadian bench, stated: “My gut feeling 
is that it does make a difference in a number of issues,” because women have 
“a certain sensitivity” and a “vision that is different from men in some cases.”25 
Given the contested viewpoints on the gender difference hypothesis, the question 
remains whether the leadership style and voting behaviour of the first female 
Canadian chief justice are demonstrably different from her two post-Charter 
male predecessors.
Female chief justices, like their male counterparts, are in an optimal position 
to take on either the task or social leadership role, although Danelski acknowledges 
that these roles can be taken on by other members of the bench.26 He argues that 
few US chief justices have been able to effectively exercise both roles—with the 
exception of Chief Justices John Marshall and Charles Evan Hughes—because 
the task leaders tend to foster conflict and tension while the social leaders try to 
alleviate antagonism and integrate the bench into a more cohesive unit.27 Given 
the institutional power of the chief justice at all stages of the judicial process, 
including the selection of cases, assignment of opinion writing, and service at 
the administrative helm of the court, the chief is in a key position to take on 
and Cross Institutional Analysis” (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Southern 
Political Science Association, 2002) [unpublished]; Donald R Songer, Ann Clark & Rebecca 
Wood, “The Effects of Judge Gender in Appellate Courts: A Comparative Cross-National 
Test” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
30 September 2003), online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539882>; 
CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of 
Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) [Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making]; 
Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent at the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 15:1&2 Intl J Leg Profession 57; Donald R Songer et al, 
Law, Ideology, and Collegiality: Judicial Behaviour in the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) [Songer et al, Law, Ideology]; Peter McCormick, 
“Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 
51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 595 [McCormick, “Who Writes”].
23. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice (New 
York: Random House, 2003) at 191.
24. Wilson, supra note 22 at 520.
25. Tonda MacCharles, “Top court benefits from diversity, LeBel Says,” Toronto Star (1 
December 2014), A8 (Lexis).
26. Danelski, “Influence,” supra note 5 at 24-25.
27. Ibid at 25.
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either of these leadership roles during his or her tenure. Although the chief justice 
is often referred to as “first among equals,” this characterization is misleading 
because it fails to acknowledge the various advantages chief justices have at their 
disposal to acquire either or both the task and social leadership roles.28 Recent 
empirical work in the United States confirms some of Danelski’s claims. For 
example, Charles M. Cameron and Tom Clark indicate that modern US chief 
justices have tended to steer “the most important cases to [their] ideological 
allies,” if not to themselves, and that the ideological location of the chief justice 
in a given case is a strong predictor of the disposition of that case, although that 
power is constrained by various institutional norms, expectations, and operating 
procedures.29 For instance, chief justices must take into consideration workload 
balance, varying abilities of justices, operational efficiency, and judicial expertise 
while also considering their policy preferences.30 Moreover, chief justices may 
moderate their own policy preferences in order to foster greater agreement and 
thereby strengthen court legitimacy.31 US chief justices, like presidents, also 
experience a potential honeymoon period during the first few years as chief 
which affords them greater opportunities to forge unanimous opinions on the 
court.32 Collectively, this body of work showcases both the power and limitations 
that promote and constrain a chief justice’s ability to lead his or her own court.
In the Canadian context, a chief justice’s ability to strike different sized 
panels provides a unique strategic lever that he or she can use to exert ideological 
control over the outcome of a case. Although some contend chief justices do not 
abuse this power across all cases, they do tend to select ideological allies more 
frequently to hear arguments in politically salient Charter disputes.33 Interviews 
with the justices, on the other hand, have led other scholars to downplay the 
notion of striking ideological panels. Indeed, Ian Greene, Carl Baar, Peter 
28. Ibid.
29. Cameron & Clark, supra note 5 at 221-24. See also Maltzmann, Spriggs & 
Wahlbeck, supra note 2.
30. Maltzmann, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 2; David J Danelski, “An Exploratory Study 
of Opinion Assignment by the Chief Justice Revisited” in Danelski & Ward, supra note 
5, 47 at 48-57.
31. Maltzmann, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 2 at 32-56. See also Drew Noble Lanier & 
Sandra L Wood, “Moving on Up: Institutional Position, Politics, and the Chief Justice” 
(2001) 22:1 Am Rev of Pol 93.
32. Amy Steigerwalt, Pamela C Corley & Artemus Ward, “Honeymoon on the Court? Chief 
Justices and Consensus Building on the Supreme Court” in Danelski & Ward, supra 
note 5, 235 at 237.
33. Lori Hausegger & Stacia Haynie, “Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the 
Canadian Supreme Court and South African Appellate Division” (2003) 37:3 Law & Soc’y 
Rev 635 at 655.
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McCormick, George Szablowski, and Martin Thomas conclude that panel and 
opinion assignment are shaped more by the chief ’s interest in seeking volunteers 
for opinion writing, balancing the workload, relying on justices’ legal expertise, 
and delivering the most unified coalition.34 Our research indicates that a larger 
panel size makes it mathematically less likely that a chief will write the majority 
opinion.35 However, we found that chief justices do write a higher percentage of 
majority opinions while serving as chief and simultaneously curb their tendencies 
to cast dissenting votes. Recent work by Peter McCormick has confirmed the 
tendency by chief justices to assign more majority opinions to themselves, and 
particularly ones that are significant to a chief ’s personal politics and are likely 
to garner publicity. He has also confirmed a gender gap across the Dickson, 
Lamer, and McLachlin Courts in the assignment of fewer important opinions to 
female puisne justices.36 These male/female differences align well with the body 
of scholarship on voting differences and opinion writing on appellate courts.37
While earlier research in Canada has analyzed strategic leadership of 
the chief justices by looking at majority opinion writing, dissenting opinion 
writing, and dissenting voting,38 it has failed to examine the change after a 
puisne justice’s transition to chief and its effect on the SCC’s mean majority 
position, its ideological direction over time, and its impact on average panel size 
in light of a decreasing docket. This study turns to these critical indicators of 
chief justice leadership. It also expands the scope of inquiry to include the bulk 
of Chief Justice McLachlin’s tenure beyond an initial glimpse of her first two 
years. More significantly, this study has the ability, for the first time, to consider 
possible gender-related factors in assessing the impact of the three post-Charter 
34. Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canada’s Courts of Appeal (Toronto: James 
Lorimer, 1998) at 119. See also Songer et al, Law, Ideology, supra note 22 at 88; Emmett 
MacFarlane, Governing from the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 104-05; McCormick, “Who Writes,” supra note 22.
35. Matthew E Wetstein & CL Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership and Political Change on the 
Supreme Court of Canada: Analyzing the Transition to Chief Justice” (2005) 38:3 Can J Pol 
Sci 653 at 663-66 [Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership”].
36. McCormick, “Who Writes,” supra note 22.
37. McCormick & Job, “Women Judges,” supra note 22; White, supra note 22; Ostberg & 
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 22 at 115-154; Songer et al, Law, Ideology, 
supra note 22 at 132-152; Belleau & Johnson, supra note 22; John Szmer, Susan W Johnson 
& Tammy A Sarver, “Does the Lawyer Matter? Influencing Outcomes on the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2007) 41:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 279; Erin B Kaheny, John J Szmer & 
Tammy A Sarver, “Women Lawyers before the Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 44:1 
Can J Pol Sci 83.
38. Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35.
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chief justices. The analysis that follows focuses on majority voting behaviour, 
opinion writing, ideological voting, and panel composition across four decades 
(1973-2014) and three post-Charter chief justiceships, situating these acts of 
judicial behaviour within the prisms of rational choice, strategic behaviour, 
leadership, and feminist theories.
There are some limitations to this research that are worth noting at the 
onset. First, although statistical analysis of case outcomes and overall records 
of voting and authorship provide important insights into leadership patterns, 
a more complete picture of strategic interaction on the Court will emerge only 
after an exploration of the inner dynamics of the Court, which are typically 
revealed in conference notes and draft opinions. Second, our analysis treats 
each case as a unique and equal data point in the data set, which does not 
acknowledge that some cases and opinions provide more salient and important 
opportunities for leadership activity (e.g., cases that are bound to draw media 
attention). We leave to another day the exploration of this type of leadership 
analysis. Third, we analyze all cases, including brief oral judgments and cases with 
lengthier written reasons for judgment. Some readers may criticize our decision 
to include oral judgments because they are almost always unanimous and almost 
always delivered by the senior justice on the panel. As such, the patterns we 
report here may inflate the overall patterns of agreement among the justices. Our 
decision to include all cases was driven by the desire to address the activities of the 
justices across the full panoply of cases they decide. We suspect that a subsequent 
study limited only to cases with written reasons for judgment may amplify the 
significant findings we report here. Finally, our analysis focuses on patterns 
of dissent authorship, dissenting votes, and majority votes, while omitting 
analysis of written concurring opinions. Readers might point out that separate 
concurrences may be just as important an expression of difference as dissents, 
and may carry as much substantive legal significance. Having said this, we hasten 
to note that concurrences are qualitatively different than dissenting opinions or 
dissenting votes, which reflect an opposition to the dispositive outcome of the 
case and whom the justice believes should win the dispute. While recognizing the 
significance of separate concurrences, we leave to another study to determine the 
prominence of leadership and joining behaviours in those formal expressions of 
difference with the majority author.39 Despite these four limitations, we believe 
the empirical analysis of case outcomes and opinion writing behaviour that 
39. We are grateful for the anonymous reviewers of our article for pointing out this 
limitation to our study.
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we highlight provides a critical insight into the leadership attributes of the 
post-Charter chiefs.
II. DATA AND METHODS: ANALYZING PUBLISHED 
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA FROM 
1973 TO 2014
The data for this study is drawn from all published opinions of the SCC from 
1973 to 2014, which becomes the source for calculating annual tabulations of 
majority voting, writing of opinions, liberal decisions, and panel sizes. Liberal 
decisions are those that support criminal defendants in criminal cases, decisions 
upholding Charter rights, decisions supporting rights claimants, decisions that 
promote equality rights, decisions favouring unions and “underdogs” in economic 
disputes, and decisions favouring the taxing power of the government in tax cases. 
The 1973 to 2014 period is highlighted for analysis because it encompasses an era 
of significant constitutional transformation in Canada and documents a period 
where the Court has played an increasingly central political role in the policy 
process. Key data points are created each year for the three justices in our study 
(Chief Justices Brian Dickson, Lamer, and McLachlin), and summary scores for 
the rest of the justices on the bench during those years. Building on earlier work, 
we use a pooled cross-sectional data set featuring annual observations for Justices 
Dickson (1973-1990), Lamer (1980-1999) and McLachlin (1989-2014) for a 
total of 64 annual judge-level observations.
There are six dependent variables in the study: (1) the annual percentage 
of majority votes cast, (2) the annual percentage of majority opinions written, 
(3) the annual percentage of dissenting opinions, (4) the annual percentage of 
unanimous opinions, (5) the annual percentage of liberal voting choices, and (6) 
the annual average of case panel size. The first variable is designed to track whether 
justices alter their voting behaviour to join majority coalitions more frequently 
once they ascend to the chief justice position. As mentioned earlier, the literature 
on social leadership and strategic choice indicates the chief should join majority 
coalitions more frequently in order to control the opinion writing and influence 
the direction of the law.40 If this is true, we expect the percentage of majority votes 
to increase after a justice becomes chief. The second, complementary variable 
follows the majority authorship rates before becoming chief justice (“pre-chief”) 
and after becoming chief justice (“post-chief”). It is expected, and past research 
40. Danelski, “Opinion Assignment,” supra note 5.
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confirms, that chiefs tend to write higher percentages of majority opinions to exert 
greater control over their own court.41 The third variable, assessing the annual 
percentage of dissenting opinions pre- and post-chief, is based on prior research 
which hypothesizes that chiefs will reduce their dissenting activity in order to 
situate themselves more frequently in the majority coalitions of their court.42 
Although the analysis of written opinions has been featured in earlier scholarship, 
our study extends the opinion analysis to almost the full complement of the 
McLachlin Court cases (fourteen years rather than the initial two years). The last 
three dependent variables, like the first set, break new ground in the Canadian 
literature by exploring whether justices shift their ideological position within 
the Court once they become chief, whether unanimity rates are impacted by 
particular chief justices, and whether modern chief justices make strategic changes 
in the size of panels selected to hear cases. Research by US scholars indicates that 
ideological movement towards the centre of the SCOTUS makes strategic sense 
because it allows a chief justice to write more majority opinions, control opinion 
assignment, and indirectly control the content of opinions.43 Additionally, 
if a chief is a strong social and task leader, the court should speak more frequently 
with a unanimous voice. The final dependent variable takes into consideration 
the chief ’s power to create panels and tests whether strategic activity has emerged 
in this area. One hypothesis, drawn from the strategic and attitudinal literature, 
would suggest that chiefs can enhance their leadership powers by selecting 
like-minded justices and by establishing smaller panels. A contrary hypothesis 
can be drawn from the literature on social leadership and interviews with the 
justices: These sources suggest that the workload is shared and the experience of 
being a justice is enhanced when panels are larger and more inclusive. Feminist 
theory adds a layer of complexity to this hypothesis by suggesting that, all other 
things being equal, a female chief justice might devote more attention to the 
social cohesion of the court’s work than her male counterparts. In short, a female 
chief might be expected to include more voices in the chorus of cases heard and 
might devote more attention to building a consensus within those larger panels. 
41. Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35.
42. Readers should note that we do not analyze patterns of writing separate concurrences in this 
study (concurrences or joining of concurrences are coded as majority/non-dissenting votes 
in our study). We believe it would be fruitful to examine patterns of concurrence separately 
to tease out how they might reflect an inability to lead the Court to a majority outcome 
and whether concurrence behaviour produces distinctively different regression coefficients 
than those found in our study for dissents and dissenting votes. This is a research project left 
for another day.
43. Epstein & Knight, supra note 2; Maltzmann, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 2.
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Our study examines which of these hypotheses play out in the behaviour of the 
three post-Charter chief justices.
The study uses a host of independent variables and examines their 
relative power to explain the patterns of behaviour mentioned above. Our key 
independent variable is the chief versus non-chief status of the three post-Charter 
justices in our study, and is denoted each year by a dichotomous indicator (0 = 
non-chief, 1 = chief ). As mentioned above, and in line with prior research on 
leadership activity, it is expected that once the three justices move to the centre 
chair they will exhibit greater task and social leadership and strategic behaviour 
by joining more majority coalitions, writing a higher percentage of majority 
opinions, decreasing dissenting authorship, shifting their ideological position 
towards the centre of the Court, and strategically using panel size power.44 There 
are two additional justice-level independent variables included in the equations, 
namely whether Justice Dickson or Justice McLachlin is in the chief role 
(1 = chief, 0 = not chief ) to track any distinctive leadership traits between the 
three post-Charter chief justices. Chief Justice Lamer was kept out of the equation 
for comparative purposes.45 There are several other independent variables that 
are included in our analysis as control variables to ensure there are no rival 
explanations for any possible changes in the judicial behaviour examined. Since 
there is high turnover on the Court, and shifting ideological composition can 
influence a chief justice’s voting behaviour and authorship activity, a measure 
calculating the ideological distance from the Court mean was included to assess 
for this possible effect.46 The logic here is that when a chief justice is closer to 
44. Our hypotheses are drawn from Danelski and McCormick. See Danelski, “Opinion 
Assignment,” supra note 5; Danelski, “Conflict and Resolution,” supra note 5; Danelski, 
“Influence,” supra note 5; Danelski, “Social Science,” supra note 5; Peter McCormick, 
“Career Patterns and the Delivery of Reasons for Judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada, 
1949-1993” (1994) 5 SCLR (2d) 499 [McCormick, “Career Patterns”]; McCormick, “Who 
Writes,” supra note 22.
45. In some instances the omitted justice is Chief Justice Dickson because the observed patterns 
of behaviour make him the most obvious justice to place in the comparative role.
46. See Lawrence Baum, “Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court” (1988) 
82:3 Am Pol Sci Rev 905; Lawrence Baum, “Membership Change and Collective Voting 
Change in the United States Supreme Court” (1992) 54:1 J Politics 3; Lanier & Wood, 
supra note 31; Wetstein & Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35. We calculate the 
ideological distance by scoring judicial votes as either liberal or conservative based on the 
disposition of the case and parties involved. Our method follows the pioneering work of 
Harold Spaeth in the US setting and other Canadian Supreme Court of Canada scholars. 
See Songer et al, Law, Ideology, supra note 22. For the treatment of ideology in US Supreme 
Court cases, see Harold Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1997 
Terms (East Lansing, Mich: Michigan State University, 1998), online: <doi.org/10.3886/
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the ideological mean of the Court as a whole in any given case, he or she is 
more likely to join the majority coalition and have more opportunities to write 
opinions. Since scholarship indicates that newly-minted chief justices write fewer 
majority opinions in the course of acclimating to the bench, an independent 
variable identifying the first two years as chief for the three justices was included 
to further test whether a freshmen or honeymoon effect appears (1 = first two 
years as chief justice, 0 = all other years as chief ).47
Four other independent variables were included in the analysis that might 
influence the judicial activity of the chief justice, namely the number of new 
justices on the bench, workload, prominence of a case, and panel size. The 
number of new justices elevated to the Court in a given year might increase 
the voting and authorship behaviour of a chief justice because scholarship has 
shown that chief justices tend to assign freshmen to a smaller workload to 
help them acclimate to the bench.48 In such circumstances, the chief justice is 
more likely to strike smaller panel sizes and has more opportunity to join the 
majority and write majority opinions. Since a heavy workload can impact how 
panels are structured, and majority authorship patterns by the various justices, 
we included a variable that calculates the number of cases the Court heard on a 
yearly basis from 1973 to 2014. We hypothesized that when justices face more 
workload pressure and time constraints in a given year, they are more likely to 
join majority coalitions and write fewer dissents. Unlike in the United States, the 
Canadian chief justice has the power to create five-, seven-, and nine-member 
panels. Although scholarship assessing whether Canadian chief justices utilize 
this power to their advantage has yielded mixed results, it is logical to expect 
that larger panel sizes would generate more conflict in a given case, especially in 
politically high-profile cases, because the more people who are in the room, the 
greater likelihood for conflict to emerge.49 This, coupled with the fact that there 
has been a movement towards larger panel sizes in recent decades, indicates the 
need to include an independent variable to control for the impact that average 
panel size per year has on the voting behaviours and authorship activities of the 
justices. Since Charter cases tend to constitute some of the most controversial 
and high-profile constitutional cases the Court has heard in the last forty years, 
it serves as a viable, though imperfect, measure of salient issues that come before 
the bench. As such, we calculated the percent of Charter cases heard by the Court 
ICPSR09422.v9>.
47. Lanier & Wood, supra note 31; McCormick, “Career Patterns,” supra note 44.
48. CL Ostberg, Matthew E Wetstein & Craig R Ducat, “Acclimation Effects on the 
Supreme Court of Canada: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Judicial Folklore” (2003) 
84:3 Soc Sci Q 704.
49. Ibid; Hausegger & Haynie, supra note 33; Greene et al, supra note 34.
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in a given year and hypothesize that the more Charter cases the Court hears, 
the greater likelihood that dissent will emerge. However, one could argue that 
in high-profile Charter cases, the chief justice is more likely to join the majority 
coalition and pen the opinion in order to control the legal direction of the Court. 
Thus, this variable was included to see which hypothesis played out. Collectively, 
these independent variables were used in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
equations to tease out possible countervailing factors beyond strategic activity 
that might explain judicial behaviour of the three chief justices.
III. RESULTS
A. MAJORITY AND LIBERAL VOTING PATTERNS AS PUISNE AND CHIEF 
JUSTICE
Table 1 provides an initial glimpse at the change in the percent majority and 
liberal voting behaviour of the three post-Charter chief justices throughout their 
tenure along with a calculation of their distance from the majority and liberal 
means of the Court. It is interesting to note that, unlike members of the US 
Supreme Court, all three justices exhibit a very high percentage of majority 
voting throughout their career, although there is a change in voting behaviour 
for two of the post-Charter chiefs. Specifically, Justices Dickson and McLachlin 
increased their frequency of majority votes when they transitioned to the centre 
chair, while Justice Lamer did not (+3.2 and +4.6 for Dickson and McLachlin 
respectively, versus -2.9). Only Justice McLachlin’s behaviour was statistically 
significant, indicating that she was almost five percent more likely to vote with 
the majority after she became chief than when she was a puisne justice. In order 
to achieve this change both she and Justice Dickson changed their percent liberal 
voting behaviour in statistically significant ways, although in opposite directions 
(see column two of Table 1). While Justice Dickson decreased his liberal voting 
by 8.5%, Justice McLachlin increased hers by almost 9%, so they had to move 
in opposite directions to situate themselves in the majorities of their own courts 
once they became chief. Although Justice Lamer also decreased his liberal 
voting behaviour by 4.6%, his movement was not demonstratively different 
from his earlier pre-chief behaviour. One must also take into consideration the 
changing nature of the court composition over each chief justice’s tenure before 
reaching any conclusions, which is a factor we control for in the third and fourth 
columns of the table.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 calculate the distances of these 
justices from the majority and liberal means of the other justices on the Court 
to help shed light on their altered activities during their transitions to chief. 
While Justice Lamer’s distance from the majority and liberal mean of the Court 
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did not change throughout his tenure, the same cannot be said for the other 
two justices. While Justice Dickson’s distance from the majority mean did not 
change dramatically, his distance from the liberal mean of the Court went down 
by 7% once he became chief, which is a statistically significant change. This 
finding suggests that although Justice Dickson continued to vote in the majority 
throughout his tenure as chief, his ideological behaviour softened during his 
chief years, positioning him, on average, at the ideological centre of his court. 
In contrast, Justice McLachlin’s distance from the liberal mean of the Court did 
not change much over her tenure, but she changed her distance from the majority 
mean by 6%. This means she was willing to dramatically change her dissenting 
behaviour to ensure that she was in the majority despite being roughly the same 
ideological distance from the other members of her bench during her tenure as 
chief as she was during her tenure as a puisne justice.
TABLE 1:  PERCENT MAJORITY, LIBERAL VOTING, DISTANCE FROM MAJORITY, 
AND LIBERAL MEAN FOR PUISNE AND CHIEF JUSTICE DICKSON, LAMER, AND 
MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014








Puisne 91.9 52.9 +0.4 +7.1
Chief 95.2 44.4 +1.8 0.0
Difference +3.2 -8.5 +1.4 -7.1
F Test 2.3 10.0** 0.6 9.8 **
Justice Lamer
Puisne 94.4 47.5 -0.1 +2.4
Chief 91.5 42.9 -0.4 +3.7
Difference -2.9 -4.6 -0.3 +1.3
F Test 1.5 1.4 0.0 0.2
Justice McLachlin
Puisne 89.4 39.4 -2.9 -0.5
Chief 94.0 48.3 +3.0 +1.5
Difference +4.6 +8.9 +5.9 +2.0
F Test 10.1 ** 7.7 ** 24.4 *** 0.8
** significant at the 99% confidence level 
*** significant at the 99.9% level
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These initial differences between Justice Dickson and Justice McLachlin’s 
activity point to a potentially compelling distinction between the two chief 
justices. On first impression, Justice McLachlin exhibited extreme social 
leadership behaviour once she became chief by voting in the majority more often, 
suppressing her prior prolific dissenting activity, and voting slightly more liberally 
to exert more control over her own court. Having said this, her ideological stance 
relative to other justices did not change dramatically. Justice Dickson, in turn, 
seized his opportunity to be a task leader, because he moved in a conservative 
direction in order to preside in the majority coalition once he became chief. 
Justice Lamer, on the other hand, did not change his behaviour once he became 
chief, suggesting that he did not take on the social leadership role that appears to 
be so coveted by Justice McLachlin. His voting patterns, at first blush, display the 
trappings of a justice uninterested in fostering greater degrees of social cohesion 
and instead reflect the habits of a justice who liked to state his mind both pre- 
and post-chief.
B. A TYPOLOGY OF IDEOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE 
TRANSITION TO CHIEF JUSTICE
The results featured in the third and fourth columns of Table 1 provide the seeds 
for a typology of strategic change for justices moving from puisne to chief justice 
status, especially since the data pays attention to relative positioning within a 
court on two metrics: (1) ideological distance from the centre of the Court, 
and (2) distance from the mean level of majoritarian voting. The two indicators 
can correlate with each other, but they need not do so across all justices. 
However, what we would expect in terms of leadership and strategic theory is 
a conscious choice and specific movement within a two-dimensional space if 
justices respond to their new leadership role. Put simply, chief justices should 
move towards the ideological middle of the court if they desire to participate 
in more majority-writing behaviour, which implies that they will increase their 
majoritarian voting patterns and likely seek to exceed the court average. Figure 
1 sketches out this hypothesized relationship for three hypothetical justices: 
a conservative-leaning justice, a moderate, and a liberal. Seen in this light, 
a conservative justice should move towards the moderate middle and seek to join 
majority coalitions more often (moving up and to the left in our graph in Figure 
1). Similarly, a strategic liberal should move up and to the right, while moderates 
should just move up (increasing their majority voting). Our typology can be 
tested by plotting the justice’s scores, pre- and post-chief, in terms of ideological 
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distance from the mean and distance from the mean levels of majority voting 
behaviour (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 1: A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR IN THE TRANSITION 
FROM PUISNE TO CHIEF JUSTICE: MAJORITARIAN AND IDEOLOGICAL 
STRATEGIC RESPONSE
Relative Position to the 
Court Mean in terms of 
Majoritarian Voting
Relative Position to the Court Mean for Liberal Voting
Liberal                        Mean                 Conservative
More Majoritarian
Mean Justice M
More Dissent Justice L Justice C
NOTES:
Justice C is a conservative justice who writes more dissents than average. Strategic response 
theory suggests that Justice C’s elevation to the chief position would result in fewer 
dissents, more majority votes (above the mean), and a curbing of ideological extremism 
(movement toward the centre).
Justice L is a liberal justice who writes more dissents than average. Strategic response theory 
suggests that his or her elevation to the chief position would result in fewer dissents, more 
majority votes (above the mean), and a curbing of ideological extremism (movement 
toward the centre).
Justice M is a relative moderate who is slightly above average in majority voting behaviour, and 
slightly more conservative than the mean. Strategic response theory suggests that Justice 
M’s elevation to the chief position would result in even more majority votes (above the 
mean), and perhaps a slight curbing of ideological extremism (further movement toward 
the centre). Justice M might exhibit the most ideological voting fluidity in order to control 
the court more often (i.e., moving left and right to establish minimum winning coalitions).
The significance of Figure 2 lies in two key findings. Readers can first think 
of the six graphs as pre- and post-chief plots of ideological and majoritarian 
voting behaviour.
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FIGURE 2: JUSTICE LIBERALISM AND MAJORITARIAN VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
RELATIVE TO THE COURT MEAN, PRE- AND POST-CHIEF STATUS, 1973-2014
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FIGURE 2: JUSTICE LIBERALISM AND MAJORITARIAN VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
RELATIVE TO THE COURT MEAN, PRE- AND POST-CHIEF STATUS, 1973-2014
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When justices appear to the left of the centre line their annual voting records 
are more conservative than the mean justice for that year. When justices are 
above the horizontal centre line, their majority voting behaviour is higher than 
the average majoritarian justice. According to theory, we expect chief justices 
to have regression lines and predominant patterns of behaviour that are above 
the horizontal centre line (i.e., if they are acting strategically, they should situate 
themselves more often in the majority coalition, at least in comparison to their 
earlier behaviour). Ideologically, it makes intuitive sense to think that justices 
more proximate to the centre vertical line will more likely be above the horizontal 
line. This aligns with the logic that ideologically moderate justices, or centrists, 
are more likely to be present in majority coalitions (for confirmation of this, think 
of Justice Anthony Kennedy in the United States and Justice Frank Iacobucci 
in Canada).50 Our data coordinates in Figure 2 tend to document this trend, 
though the patterns across the three post-Charter chiefs are not constant. Justice 
Dickson’s movement post-chief is more dramatic in terms of its ideologically 
conservative shift towards the centre of the Court (movement towards the left 
in the Figure 2.B). Justice Lamer, meanwhile, exhibits a pattern of behaviour 
across both graphs suggesting that as he found himself more liberal than the 
Court mean, he increased his tendency to vote in dissent. In fact, his most liberal 
distance from the mean appeared in his last year on the Court, resulting in his 
lowest majority voting percentage of his entire judicial career. The wide variation 
in his majority support scores suggests very little strategic ideological moderation 
on his part. While he successfully sought out the ability to write more majority 
opinions generally, it was sacrificed at the altar of any notions of ideological 
centrism. Put simply, he did not appear to care if he was ideologically proximate 
to the centre of the Court, especially in the waning days of his career. Justice 
McLachlin, meanwhile, exhibits the most majoritarian strategic behaviour of all 
three justices. Her voting record shifts noticeably upward after becoming chief 
(note the change in the level of the regression lines in Figures 2.E and 2.F). Her 
higher scores on majority voting tend to cluster around the vertical centre line, 
and nearly every post-chief year features a positive value relative to the Court 
mean on the majority voting score (in Figure 2.F). All of her pre-chief years are 
below the horizontal line (Figure 2.E). Justice McLachlin’s graphs document clear 
strategic behaviour that is not necessarily rooted in ideological change. Rather, 
her wide swings in ideological position post-chief are less important than how 
50. For discussion of Justice Iacobucci’s role as a centrist justice, see Benjamin RD Alarie & 
Andrew Green, “The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career 
on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 57:2 UTLJ 195.
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she increased her majority voting stances and suppressed her earlier tendency 
to dissent. These are hallmark patterns of two forces at work: (1) a strategic 
response to allow her to put her stamp on her own court’s legal doctrines, and (2) 
a social leadership response on her part that is captured by the declining desire to 
participate in dissents from her colleagues’ opinions.
A second point of significance in Figure 2 hinges on the behaviour 
immediately preceding elevation to chief status for all three justices. The two years 
immediately before chief status are highlighted in the left side graphs with blue 
shading, while the first two years of chief are highlighted on the right side. Note 
how each justice, immediately before becoming chief, altered their behaviour to 
become more majoritarian (Figures 2.A, 2.C, and 2.D). This, in and of itself, 
may be an interesting finding of strategic signaling to the powers that be in the 
Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of Justice. If the parties responsible 
for vetting future chiefs pay attention to collegial, coalition-building behaviour, 
and if justices are aware that their majoritarian behaviour might be one of those 
key signals to become chief justice, we find an interesting nugget within our 
graphs of altered strategic voting in the year preceding a chief justiceship. It is also 
interesting to note, however, that for each new chief justice, the second-year data 
point is lower than the first, with each chief moving down and to the right in 
Figures 2.B, 2.D, and 2.F (exhibiting more liberal and less majoritarian voting in 
their second year as chief ). This may reflect a rebalancing on the part of the chief 
back towards an expression of a latent independent streak. It may also reflect 
the changing dynamics of their courts. In each case, they faced membership 
transitions that may have pushed or pulled them in a slightly liberal direction. 
Such compositional change is somewhat controlled for in the graphs by using 
a mean benchmark comparison, but the possibility of membership change and 
court docket change argue for a more nuanced analysis that can take into account 
various explanatory variables.
C. OPINION AUTHORSHIP AND PATTERNS OF UNANIMITY AS PUISNE AND 
CHIEF JUSTICE
Table 2 highlights three other indicators of potential leadership behaviour: 
majority opinion authorship, dissent authorship, and the degree of unanimity 
within a court. Intriguingly, Justice McLachlin exhibits two of the most profound 
changes in Table 2. She clearly increased her majority opinion authorship during 
her own court (jumping from almost 9% as puisne to almost 18% post-chief ). 
Linked with that was a substantial decrease in dissenting opinion output, dropping 
from 5.5% of cases to just 1.7% in her later years. One can infer from the data 
that these transformations are clearly not random, but rather reflect a strategic 
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positive shift towards task opinion leadership during her chief tenure, while also 
reflecting a more socially responsible pattern of dissent suppression that probably 
resonated well with her colleagues. Note how her change in patterns stands 
in stark contrast to the lack of change by Chief Justice Dickson’s authorship 
activity or Chief Justice Lamer’s dissenting authorship once they moved to the 
helm of the Court. Justice Lamer’s rate of dissenting opinions, while not radically 
different from his earlier years, actually increased slightly during his chief period. 
This fact, in addition to the decline in unanimous opinions in Table 2, is another 
indicator that social cohesion probably suffered during Chief Justice Lamer’s 
Court, and, at first blush, suggests that he did not seek a social leadership role 
on his own court. Granted, much of Justice Lamer’s tenure as chief overlapped 
with that of the great dissenter Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, but one can speculate 
whether the greater rates of dissent found in the Lamer Court might have been 
different under a chief justice with more highly tuned social leadership skills. 
However, his rise in majority authorship by almost 7% indicates that he, like 
Justice McLachlin, seemed intent on enhancing his task leadership role on his 
own court. Even so, these conclusions are preliminary and without the assistance 
of multivariate analysis that controls for rival explanatory variables.
TABLE 2:  EXPLAINING MAJORITY AUTHORSHIP, DISSENTING AUTHORSHIP, AND 
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS FOR PUISNEAND CHIEF JUSTICES DICKSON, LAMER, AND 
MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Justice Percent Majority Author





Puisne 11.4 3.2 75.1
Chief 14.7 2.0 79.0
Difference +3.3 -1.2 +3.9
F Test 2.4 2.8 .8
Justice Lamer
Puisne 11.0 2.3 82.4
Chief 17.9 2.6 73.9
Difference +6.9 +.3 -8.5
F Test 9.3 ** .1 11.2 **
Justice McLachlin
Puisne 8.8 5.5 74.1
Chief 17.4 1.7 71.6
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TABLE 2:  EXPLAINING MAJORITY AUTHORSHIP, DISSENTING AUTHORSHIP, AND 
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS FOR PUISNEAND CHIEF JUSTICES DICKSON, LAMER, AND 
MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Justice Percent Majority Author




Difference +8.6 -3.8 -2.5
F Test 37.7 *** 36.5 *** 1.1
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level
D. EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF MAJORITY VOTING AS PUISNE AND CHIEF 
JUSTICE
Table 3 examines the majority voting behaviour of all three chiefs, with the 
analysis turning to a multivariate model that can assess the impact of other 
factors that help explain changes in chief activity. The results in the first two 
columns test for any chief effects across all three justices of interest, while the last 
two columns isolate any differences between Chief Justices Dickson, Lamer, and 
McLachlin over the 1973-2014 period while controlling for other variables in the 
equation. The Chief Justice Lamer indicator was omitted in the latter equation 
to test for statistically significant differences because he exhibited the smallest 
change in majority voting behaviour of the three justices. There are a total of 
seven variables in the first equation and eight in the second. Both overall models 
provide a robust explanation of the variance in majority voting, accounting for 
31% and 27%, respectively, of the variance across the years in the study (adjusted 
R square = 0.31 for all chiefs and 0.27 for the model contrasting against Justice 
Lamer, both F tests are significant at the 99.9% confidence level). The findings 
in the first and second columns of the table reveal that four of the variables in 
the equation proved statistically significant at predicting majority voting of the 
three justices at or above the 99% confidence level. The most powerful variable 
in the equation was the chief justice variable indicating, as expected, that when 
they were elevated to the centre chair position they were overall 3% more likely 
to vote in the majority (b = 3.4, see the first column of Table 3). This provides 
confirmation of Danelski’s theory that, collectively, when these justices became 
chief, they acted in a strategic manner. The three other variables that were in 
the expected direction and statistically significant were panel size, ideological 
distance from the Court mean, and Charter caseloads. The average panel size 
indicator featured a coefficient of -2.24 and suggests that as the average panel 
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size increased from seven to nine members, the three chief justices’ tendencies to 
join the majority coalition decreased by 4% (2 multiplied by 2.24 = 4.48, see the 
first column of Table 3). Clearly, the size of a given panel has a direct impact on 
whether a justice joins the majority and thus has a greater opportunity to control 
the outcome of the Court. When the percentage of Charter cases increased by 
10%, there was an almost 2% drop in the likelihood that the three justices would 
join the majority voting bloc (b = -.17, 10 x .17 = 1.7%, see the first column 
of Table 3). Similarly, when the ideological distance from the mean grew, the 
three chiefs voted with the majority coalition less often (b = -.32). Put another 
way, if a justice was 10% more liberal than the rest of the justices in a given year, 
they would cast 3.2% fewer majority votes. The coefficients for these variables 
document the impact of a variety of factors that can either push or pull a justice 
towards the majoritarian centre of their court. Most importantly for leadership 
theories of judicial behaviour, the elevation to chief status clearly results in a 
positive strategic impact that produces more majority votes.
TABLE 3:  EXPLAINING MAJORITY VOTING BEHAVIOUR BY JUSTICES DICKSON, 
LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN PRE- AND POST-CHIEF STATUS, 1973-2014
Variable Estimation for All Chiefs Chiefs Contrasted with Lamer
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Chief Justice 3.43 1.35**
Chief Year 1 or 2 -.52 1.79 .19 1.80
Average Panel Size -2.24 .82** -2.61 1.05**
Ideol. Distance from Mean -.32 .08*** -.29 .09***
Percent Charter Cases -.17 .05*** -.13 .05**
Number of New Justices .62 .67 .19 .73
Number of Cases -.04 .03 -.02 .03
Dickson as Chief 2.35 1.82
McLachlin as Chief 4.23 2.22*
Constant 113.82 6.62 114.19 7.28
Adjusted R Square .31 .27
F Test 4.94*** 3.90***
Number of Observations 64 64
* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level
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The data in the third and fourth columns of Table 3 takes into consideration 
possible differences in majority voting behaviour between the three chiefs, as was 
suggested by Table 1. Given that Justice Lamer exhibited little change in his 
voting behaviour, his indicator was kept out of the equation for comparison 
purposes. The second half of Table 3 suggests that much of the chief justice 
transition effect is due to the behavioural difference of Justice McLachlin. 
The findings indicate that only Chief Justice McLachlin exhibited statistically 
significant difference in majority voting behaviour from Chief Justice Lamer (b = 
4.23, significant at the 95% confidence level), indicating that she was 4% more 
likely than Justice Lamer to vote with the majority once controlling for other 
variables in the equation. While Chief Justice Dickson did join the majority more 
often than Chief Justice Lamer, his change was not statistically significant and 
suggests that he did not transform his status as a joiner of opinions, certainly not 
as much as his female successor did. Meanwhile, the same three other variables 
that proved statistically significant across all the chiefs were significant in this 
equation as well. Collectively, these findings reinforce the findings from Table 1, 
suggesting that Chief Justice McLachlin acted in the most strategic manner of 
the three justices, changing her behaviour to become the consistent social leader 
of the majority of her court. This pattern of majority voting change stands up in 
the face of other rival explanatory factors for her behaviour, and it fits with her 
own comments and expert reports on her approach to leading the Court more 
cohesively and collegially.51
E. EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF MAJORITY AUTHORSHIP AS PUISNE AND 
CHIEF JUSTICE
An interesting question that dovetails with increased majority voting is whether 
that transformation results in a concordant increase in majority opinion 
writing—one of the hallmarks of task leadership in any court of last resort. Table 
4 provides regression results to confirm the expectation that chief justices will 
strategically work to assume this leadership role. Like the prior model, it examines 
the opinion-writing relationship for all three justices collectively in the first two 
51. Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, “The First Decade of the 21st Century: The Supreme 
Court of Canada in Context” in David A Wright & Adam M Dodek, eds, Public Law at 
the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) vii; Peter J McCormick, 
The End of the Charter Revolution: Looking Back from the New Normal (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2015) at 121-22; “Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin announces her 
retirement after 28 years on Canada’s top bench,” The National Post (12 June 2017), online: 
<nationalpost.com/news/politics/chief-justice-beverley-mclachlin-announcers-her-retirement-
after-28-years-on-canadas-top-bench>.
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columns of the table and relative to each other in the third and fourth columns 
of the table, this time omitting Justice Dickson because he altered his behaviour 
the least. The overall statistics provide robust models, with the adjusted R Squares 
of 0.42 and 0.49, which means that the model explains 42% and nearly 50% 
of the variance in the justices’ majority opinion writing behaviour (statistically 
significant at 99.9% confidence level, see the Adjusted R Square values in Table 
4). Like the previous table, the most important variable in the equation is the 
chief justice variable, indicating that collectively the three justices increased their 
majority writing output four percentage points as chief justice, allowing them to 
exert more control over the direction of the Court (statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level). Two other indicators are significant predictors of majority 
opinion output: (1) whether a chief justice was in his or her honeymoon period 
(denoted by the first two years, b = 3.39, significant at the 95% confidence level), 
and (2) the percentage of times they were in the majority coalition. For every 
3% increase in majority votes in a year, the justices tended to write 1% more 
majority opinions (b = 0.36, 3 x 0.36 = 1.08, significant at the 99% confidence 
level). Readers should note that the effects of chief justice status on majority 
opinion output are mainly derived from strategic changes made by Justices 
Lamer and McLachlin. When we omit Justice Dickson from the equation, the 
R Square value improves, and the impact of the indicators for Justices Lamer 
(6.12% change) and McLachlin (5.84% change) are substantially higher than 
in the first model (4.40%, see Table 4). The data for Chief Justice McLachlin is 
particularly compelling because it reflects a departure from our initial findings 
of lower majority opinion output by Chief Justice McLachlin in the first two 
years of her leadership.52 Put simply, the addition of 12 years of data documents 
an increasing tendency on Chief Justice McLachlin’s part to write more majority 
opinions for her court. Such a transformation reflects the signature patterns of 
a task leader. All in all, the regression models reinforce the leadership literature’s 
central theoretical proposition that puisne justices who become chief can use the 
act of voting more frequently in majority coalitions to help cement their ability 
to lead their court. Moreover, the models help establish the unique strength of 
the strategic behavioural change undertaken by Justice McLachlin. She is the 
quintessential majoritarian leader on her court, having softened her dissenting 
voting stances of the past to help build social cohesion and collegiality, which has 
arguably strengthened the reputation of the Court.
52. Wetstein & Ostberg, Strategic Leadership,” supra note 35 at 665.
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TABLE 4:  EXPLAINING MAJORITY OPINION AUTHORSHIP BY JUSTICES DICKSON, 
LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Variable Estimation for All Chiefs Chiefs Contrasted with Dickson
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Chief Justice 4.40 1.51**
Chief Year 1 or 2 3.39 1.90* 4.13 1.71**
Average Panel Size -.28 .93 -1.38 1.10
Ideol. Distance from Mean .03 .10 .01 .09
Percent Charter Cases .08 .06 .08 .05
Number of New Justices -.30 .72 -.19 .71
Number of Cases -.02 .03 -.02 .03
Percent Majority Votes .36 .14** .36 .13**
Lamer as Chief 6.12 1.57***
McLachlin as Chief 5.84 2.25**
Constant -19.93 -12.87
Adjusted R Square .42 .49
F Test 6.76*** 7.67***
Number of Observations 64 64
* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level
Simultaneously, she transformed herself into a pivotal task leader within 
her court, positioning herself to have a greater shot at writing for the Court 
more frequently.
F. EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF DISSENTING AUTHORSHIP AS PUISNE AND 
CHIEF JUSTICE
If majority opinion authorship is a key indicator of task leadership, lack of 
dissenting authorship might be seen as a flip-side symbol of social leadership. 
When justices suppress their dissent, they are likely to be expressing ideological 
assent, or more significantly, deciding not to ruffle feathers while they harbour 
ideologically opposed views. When the latter behaviour occurs, justices are 
acting strategically to enhance the social relationships within the court and foster 
greater cohesion. Table 5 turns to an indirect barometer of social leadership, 
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analyzing patterns of dissenting opinions by the three justices before and after 
their promotion to the centre chair. Overall patterns are characterized in the first 
two columns of the table, while possible differences between the three justices 
are tested in the third and fourth columns of the table. This model controls for 
ideological distance in order to tease out whether reduced patterns of dissent are 
evident because of an element of social leadership or ideological agreement, while 
simultaneously assessing whether chiefs express dissent less frequently. Both 
overall models provide a robust explanation of the variance in dissenting opinion 
authorship rates, accounting for 40% and 33% of the variance across the 41 
years of the study (adjusted R square = 0.40 for all chiefs and 0.33 for the model 
contrasting against Justice Dickson, both F tests are significant at the 99.9% 
confidence level). The findings in the first two columns of Table 5 indicate that 
that the chief justice variable provides the most important explanation for change 
in dissenting opinion authorship. When the three justices moved to the helm of 
the Court, they collectively reduced the number of dissents they authored by 
almost 2.5%. This finding provides additional evidence to support Danelski’s 
claim that when justices move to the centre chair they have the power to curb 
their dissenting authorship activity to bring more cohesion to the Court.
Four other variables proved statistically significant in the equation, and three 
of them were in the expected direction. For each new justice appointed to the 
bench in any given year, the chief justice is likely to reduce the number of dissents 
he or she authors by over 0.5% (b = -0.57, statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level). This finding suggests that new justices encourage chiefs to act 
more collegially and try to create more cohesion on the bench. As expected, when 
the ideological distance from the mean of the Court grew, the three justices were 
more likely to write dissents (b = .11, significant at the 99.9% confidence level). 
A more understandable way to interpret this is that if the three justices are 10% 
more liberal than the rest of the justices in a given year, they would write 1.1% 
more dissents in that year. As expected, when the percent of Charter cases grew 
in a given year, the percent of dissenting opinions authored by the three chiefs 
increased by 0.10%. In other words, for each additional 10 Charter cases heard 
in a given year, the justices were likely to write 1 more dissenting opinion. Given 
that Charter cases are likely to garner more conflict among members of the Court, 
this finding is not particularly surprising. However, contrary to expectations, the 
findings suggest that as the number of cases increased in a given year, the three 
chief justices were more likely to write dissenting opinions (b = .02, statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level). Thus, if the Court were to increase the 
workload by 20 cases in a given year, the dissenting opinion output would increase 
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by almost 0.5% (b = .02 x 20 = .40, see Table 5). One could posit that this makes 
sense because the more cases one hears the more likely that conflict could emerge 
on the Court, leading to greater dissent activity by these three justices.
TABLE 5: EXPLAINING DISSENTING OPINION AUTHORSHIP BY JUSTICES 
DICKSON, LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN, 1973-2014
Variable Estimation for All Chiefs Chiefs Contrasted with Dickson
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Chief Justice -2.46 .57***
Chief Year 1 or 2 .19 .75 -.46 .76
Average Panel Size .56 .34 .78 .46*
Ideol. Distance from Mean .11 .04*** .12 .04***
Percent Charter Cases .10 .02*** .09 .02***
Number of New Justices -.57 .28* -.637 .32*
Number of Cases .02 .01* .03 .01*
Lamer as Chief -2.21 .69***
McLachlin as Chief -2.00 .97*
Constant -3.15 -5.53
Adjusted R Square .40 .33
F Test 7.06*** 4.93***
Number of Observations 64 64
* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 provide a more in-depth 
understanding of the differences in the dissent authorship among the three 
chiefs. Chief Justice Dickson was kept out of the equation for comparative 
purposes because his dissent authorship changed the least. When controlling 
for other variables in the equation, both Justice Lamer and Justice McLachlin’s 
dissenting opinion authorship declined by 2.2% and 2.0% respectively after they 
became chief compared to Justice Dickson (significant at the 99.9% and 95% 
confidence level). These findings help shore up the data for Justice McLachlin 
in Table 2 and show that when controlling for other variables in the equation, 
Justice Lamer’s dissent output actually decreased significantly when compared to 
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his male predecessor, which runs counter to the findings in Table 2. Table 5, then, 
provides an important rationale for controlling for rival variables in the equation. 
The initial impression of Justice Lamer dissenting more frequently is somewhat 
misguided because it fails to take into consideration factors that might foster 
dissents, including a larger volume of Charter cases, new members on the Court, 
and a growing docket of cases under Chief Justice Lamer’s tenure. Put another 
way, Justice Lamer’s dissenting behaviour during his tenure as chief does not look 
so bad in the context of the volume and types of cases his court grappled with, 
and he shows some signs of strategic dissent suppression. The most compelling 
finding from Table 5, however, is the overwhelming evidence of the extensive 
strategic social leadership activity of Chief Justice McLachlin.
G. EXPLAINING CHANGES IN PANEL SIZE ON THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA
What is most striking about the McLachlin transition to the power roles of task 
and social leader is how it was accompanied by a tendency to grow average panel 
sizes over time. Table 6 presents this tendency in stark relief, examining the 
average panel size as a dependent variable across the three chief justice tenures. 
It essentially tests for whether there was a change in the panel size across the three 
chief tenures while considering possible rival explanations for this phenomenon. 
The overall model provides a robust explanation of the variance in the average 
panel size, accounting for 45% of the variance across the years in the study 
(adjusted R square = 0.45, F test significant at the 99.9% confidence level). The 
equation omits Justice Lamer’s indicator for comparative purposes, and reveals 
that only the “McLachlin as Chief” variable and the number of new justices 
provide statistically significant predictors of the average panel size. The latter 
variable indicates that for each new justice appointed to the bench in any given 
year, the chief justice is likely to reduce the average panel size by almost 0.25% 
(b = 0.23, statistically significant at the 99% confidence level). This finding 
suggests that there is some legitimacy to the contention that chief justices allow 
new justices a bit of time to acclimate to the top bench before throwing them 
fully into the panel rotation. Over the course of Chief Justice McLachlin’s tenure 
she increased the average size of deliberating panels by more than one justice 
(b = 1.22 statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level). This finding 
is significant because logically as one increases the average size of panels, there 
is a greater likelihood disagreement will emerge and, as Table 2 indicates, the 
less likely the justices collectively will join the majority opinion. This table 
suggests that Chief Justice McLachlin’s social leadership behaviour was unique 
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in that she not only increased the average size of the panels but joined majority 
opinions more frequently despite the fact that she maintained relatively the same 
ideological distance from her colleagues as when she was a puisne justice. These 
combined findings suggest that Justice McLachlin deserves the title of “super 
social leader” because she changed her behaviour so drastically in relation to her 
former male colleagues.
TABLE 6:  EXPLAINING THE CHANGE IN AVERAGE PANEL SIZE ACROSS THE 
DICKSON, LAMER, AND MCLACHLIN COURTS, 1973-2014
Variable Chiefs Contrasted with Lamer
Coefficient Std. Error
Dickson as Chief -.22 .23
McLachlin as Chief 1.22 .23***
Chief Year 1 or 2 .02 .23
Percent Charter Cases .00 .01
Number of New Justices -.23 .09**
Number of Cases .01 .00
Constant 6.12 .45
Adjusted R Square .45
F Test 9.45***
Number of Observations 64
* significant at the 95% confidence level
** significant at the 99% confidence level
*** significant at the 99.9% level
The last finding presents a central kernel that must be attributed to Justice 
McLachlin’s leadership of her court. She became more majoritarian while also 
increasing the level of justices’ participation on case panels. Those are two 
phenomena that would normally cut against each other. Yet we believe she was 
able to do this most likely because of her social leadership acumen. She clearly 
cares about the nature of consensus building and the importance of the Court 
speaking with a unified voice (she has said so directly).53 The fact that she was 
able to retain remarkably strong patterns of majoritarian voting and maintain 
relatively high levels of unity across the Court while growing panel sizes is a 
53. McLachlin, supra note 51.
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remarkable feat of leadership. One reason for her success may be that, during her 
tenure, the Court as a whole was shrinking its overall docket. The caseloads of 
the Lamer Court were typically at or above 100 per year.54 The McLachlin Court 
averaged between 60 and 75 per year. Such a transformation in workload suggests 
an additional pattern of social leadership is in play. When docket sizes decline in 
such a manner, more justices can be appointed to panels, making the work feel 
more equalized and balanced in terms of cases heard, equalizing opportunities 
for writing, and potentially enhancing the overall collegial esprit de corps. These 
are patterns of female leadership behaviour that are cornerstones of the feminist 
literature. For all of these reasons—greater majoritarian voting, suppressed 
dissenting opinion patterns, increased panel sizes, and decreased docket sizes—
Chief Justice McLachlin exhibits hallmark attributes of an exemplary strategic 
social and task leader.
IV. CONCLUSION
Theories of leadership and strategic behaviour posit that individuals ascending 
to the chief justice position alter their behaviour in significant ways to define 
the legacy of their court. Recent empirical work has examined the postulates of 
Danelski’s leadership theory in great detail in the Supreme Court of the United 
States,55 and there is growing interest in the leadership traits of SCC justices. Our 
work builds on earlier scholarship in this area by documenting these patterns more 
extensively across six key indicators of judicial behaviour, including majority voting 
behaviour, majority and dissenting opinion authorship, ideological and majority 
positioning within a court, and panel sizes. The concordance of data indicates 
that Chief Justice McLachlin changed her behaviour the most dramatically of the 
three modern chief justices of the SCC. She transformed from one of the most 
prolific dissenters during her puisne years into a chief who dramatically curbed 
the number of dissents she wrote, joined the majority coalition more often, and 
nearly doubled her majority opinion authorship patterns. Her transformation is 
indicative of a justice who strove to become both the social and task leader of her 
54. Supreme Court of Canada, “Statistics 2007 to 2017” (28 February 2018), online: <www.
scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/stat/cat4-eng.aspx>; Peter McCormick, “Where Does the Supreme 
Court Caseload Come From? Appeals from the Atlantic Courts of Appeal, 2000-2005” 
(Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 2 June 
2006), online: <www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/McCormick.pdf>.
55. See Danelski & Ward, supra note 5.
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court. She fostered a more cohesive and collegial court through her suppression 
of dissent and her willingness to grow panel sizes amidst a shrinking docket.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s emergence as a unique kind of social and task 
leader raises an important question about the role of her gender in shaping such 
a transformation. Was her leadership transition the byproduct of her unique skills 
and personality attributes or was there some component of feminist thinking 
embedded in her operational style as the first woman to be “first among equals?” 
We can only speculate without questioning her directly on this point. Yet her 
empirical patterns of behaviour, and the manner in which she has described the 
Court’s operations and its role suggests she paid great attention to the norms of 
collegiality, reaching greater agreement, speaking with one voice, and protecting 
the Court from criticism as a political institution. These traits match up well 
with notions drawn from the literature depicting a different feminine voice. 
Obviously, we do not want to draw definitive conclusions in a study of just one 
female chief justice, but Chief Justice McLachlin’s language often reflects the 
spirit of conciliation, compromise,  fairness, and unity, all of which echo from 
the works of Tannen and Gilligan.56 When these patterns of language are coupled 
with her lessened tendency to dissent and greater tendency to allow more justices 
to participate in cases heard by the Court, we suspect that a feminine difference 
was clearly in play with Chief Justice McLachlin. It will be interesting to see if 
this gender distinction becomes something of a pattern with the appointment of 
another female chief justice.57
Chief Justice McLachlin’s leadership transformation is not to be seen as 
negating the task leadership skills of her predecessors. While Chief Justice Lamer’s 
majority opinion authorship patterns clearly document that he was an overall 
task leader on his own court, evidence of Justice Dickson’s leadership activity 
is less pronounced because our analysis has placed him in contrast to the other 
two post-Charter chief justices. Prior research has documented that Chief Justice 
Dickson exhibited profoundly strong task leadership in key areas of law, most 
notably in the fields of civil rights and liberties and the environment.58 We also 
know from prior work that Chief Justice Lamer acted as a central opinion author 
56. Tannen, supra note 15; Gilligan, supra note 13.
57. Researchers will have to wait for that day to come. In December 2017, Justice Richard 
Wagner was appointed as the new chief justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. See 
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, (12 December 2017), online: SCC Lexum 
<scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/5694/index.do>.
58. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 22 at 119; Matthew E Wetstein 
& CL Ostberg, Value Change in the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2017) at 52-53.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL514
in the criminal law cases across his entire tenure on the Court.59 This finding points 
to a unique feature of how the Court operates, namely that the chief justices, 
through their opinion assignments, are willing to allow different justices to play 
key leadership roles in different areas of law based on their legal specialization 
and interests. Indeed, interviews with the justices confirm this tendency to solicit 
volunteers based on specialization and workload considerations.60 The limitations 
of our study prevent an analysis of this characterization of judicial leadership. 
We leave to another day the exploration of the nuances found in discrete areas of 
law, patterns of separate concurrences, patterns of behaviour in written reasons for 
judgment only, and more importantly an examination of the internal dynamics 
within a court that would help document the social leadership patterns on the 
post-Charter courts. Despite this caveat, the empirical patterns from this study 
indicate that at the twilight of her tenure, Chief Justice McLachlin cemented her 
legacy as a justice who was able to simultaneously serve as a social and task leader 
on the top court of Canada.
59. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 22 at 72-74.
60. Greene et al, supra note 34; Songer et al, Law, Ideology, supra note 22.
